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DISCUSSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Christina E. Wells* 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA. Edited 
by Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 2002. Pp. x, 330. Cloth, $35. 
Since the First Amendment's inception, Americans have agreed 
that free expression is foundational to our democratic way of life.1 
Though we agree on this much, we have rarely agreed on much else 
regarding the appropriate parameters of free expression. Is the First 
Amendment absolute or does it allow some regulation of speech? 
Should the First Amendment protect offensive speech, pornography, 
flag-burning? Why do we protect speech - to promote the search for 
truth, to promote self-governance, or to protect individual autonomy?2 
History is rife with disagreements regarding these issues to which 
there are no definitive answers. Certainly, the text of the First 
Amendment does not help;3 nor do the contemporaneous but 
conflicting historical documents. 
In light of the First Amendment's textual generality, the Supreme 
Court has had to make up free speech doctrine as it goes along, 
using whatever tools it can find. The result is a complex set of legal 
rules regulating speech and expressive conduct that evolved over 
the last century, which has endured its fair share of criticism. Increas­
ingly, scholars claim that the Court's free speech decisions are 
theoretically incoherent4 or untrue to the First Amendment's original 
* Enoch N. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. 
B.A. 1985, University of Kansas; J.D. 1988, University of Chicago. -Ed. 
l. DA YID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTfEN YEARS 13 (1997); see a/so 
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2002, at 14, 23 (2002) 
(showing that Americans currently believe that First Amendment protections are essential 
to our way of life). 
2. Compare ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-27 (1948) (self-governance theory), with David A.J. Richards, Free 
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 45, 62 (1974) (self-fulfillment theory), and Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-18 (1972) (autonomy theory). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .  "). 
4. See, e.g. , Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1249 (1995). 
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roots.5 Criticism of the Court is also apparent at the public level, albeit 
in a more indirect manner. Recent polls show that the American 
public, although valuing free expression in the abstract, increasingly 
believes that the "First Amendment goes too far in the rights it 
guarantees," a trend exacerbated by security concerns arising after the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.6 
The Court has certainly left itself open to criticism. First 
Amendment doctrine is complex. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
often fails to support adequately its decisions with sound reasoning, 
instead relying on rhetoric and/or selective precedent.7 Finally, the 
increasing number of fractured (and sometimes rancorous) opinions 
suggests a lack of coherence to Supreme Court decisions or that the 
Court is more political than judicial in nature.8 But to say that First 
Amendment doctrine is increasingly complex and controversial is not 
to say that it is incoherent or that free speech rights have gone too far. 
True, Supreme Court resolutions of individual, hard cases are often 
easily criticized. Nevertheless, the structure of our free speech law 
makes sense, providing a useful framework for resolving most disputes 
and understanding when and why speech should be protected. Moreo­
ver, the complexity and controversy associated with First Amendment 
doctrine are virtues rather than failings because they reflect the 
ongoing dialogue and experimentation that is as critical to constitu­
tional adjudication as it is to democracy.9 
At a time when the First Amendment is in danger of losing its 
cachet, Eternally Vigilant, an eclectic set of essays edited by Lee 
Bollinger10 and Geoffrey Stone,11 reminds us of the importance of 
5. See, e.g. , ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 140-53 (1996); 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-
35 (1971). 
6. FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, supra note 1, at 2, 9-10. While seventy-five percent of 
respondents to the First Amendment Center's survey believed that free speech was essential 
to our way of life, in response to concrete questions regarding particular speech, sixty-four 
percent believed that people should not be allowed to say racially offensive things in public 
and forty-six percent believed that the Constitution should be amended to ban desecration 
of the United States flag. In both circumstances, public opinion deviates from existing Su­
preme Court precedent. 
7. See Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The 
Consequences of Falling into the Theoretical Abyss, 33 GA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998). 
8. Id. at 5 n.20: Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 
1989, at 49, 53 (noting the increasingly "cynical" view that "constitutional law is only a mat­
ter of which president appointed the last few justices"). 
9. For a more in-depth discussion of the fluid nature of constitutional adjudication, see 
generally  DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: 
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
10. Professor of Law & President, Columbia University. 
11. Harry Kalven, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi­
cago Law School. 
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dialogue and experimentation in First Amendment doctrine. Rather 
than attempt to bring a rigid coherence to our system of free expres­
sion, Eternally Vigilant locates the heart of the First Amendment in its 
very complexity and embraces the resulting debate as part and parcel 
of the First Amendment itself. As the editors note, their goals are to 
"elucidate some of the more perplexing challenges and mysteries" 
associated with the protection of free expression and "inspire the kind 
of thought, deliberation, and debate that are essential" to free and 
open discourse (p. x). 
Eternally Vigilant reinforces the positive dialogic aspects of the 
First Amendment in several ways. First, the diverse essays cover a 
variety of topics and viewpoints. This variety of lenses with which to 
view the First Amendment allows far greater access to the free speech 
debate than any single theory of free expression possibly could. 
Second, the often-conflicting essays aptly demonstrate that dialogue 
and debate about the First Amendment is an affirmative good in itself. 
Finally, many of the essays examine various potential influences on 
the creation and evolution of First Amendment law. They thus take 
free speech principles out of the isolated discussions of abstract theory 
and doctrine that so often dominate free speech scholarship. Such 
examination dramatically adds to our understanding and analysis of 
why the Court sometimes protects speech when it is controversial or 
counterintuitive to do so. 
Despite its many good qualities, Eternally Vigilant nevertheless 
suffers from a flaw common to First Amendment scholarship - a 
tendency to give short shrift to study of the social, psychological, 
historical, and political factors that influence the Court's decision­
making and, thus, free speech doctrine. Discussion including these 
influences would facilitate an even greater understanding of free 
speech doctrine and the principles that underlie it. 
I. ETERNALLY VIGILANT 
Constructed primarily around ten essays written by the premier 
free speech scholars of our time, Eternally Vigilant begins with a col­
loquy between its two editors, themselves heavy hitters in the First 
Amendment field, that is designed to "introduce nonexperts to 
the labyrinth of theory, doctrine, and social texture that mark the 
jurisprudence of the First Amendment and the essays in [the] book" 
(p. x). It thus summarizes the history and foundations of free speech 
law, focusing initially on several post-World War I cases in which the 
Supreme Court, facing the First Amendment implications of seditious 
speech and attempts to punish it, generated the origins of modern 
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doctrine. 12 It then follows the evolution of this original doctrine 
through the twentieth century, explaining how it relates to various 
aspects of modern free speech law, including the Supreme Court's 
rules with respect to content-based and content-neutral regulations 
(pp. 15-16, 19-21 ), the legal issues associated with the Court's designa­
tion of some speech as "low value" (pp. 8-11), the rules relating to 
public access to certain public property (pp. 11-12), the prohibition 
against prior restraints (p. 17), and the differing treatment of various 
media outlets (pp. 12-14). 
With the general overview of First Amendment law established, 
the essays begin with a historical piece, titled Free Speech and the 
Common Law Constitution, by David Strauss. A response to origi­
nalist and textualist conceptions of the First Amendment, Strauss 
posits that neither is the actual source of free speech doctrine (pp. 33-
44 ). Rather, Strauss argues that the fundamental principles of constitu­
tional law "did not begin to emerge as a coherent body of legal princi­
ples until well into the twentieth century" and that these principles 
emerged "in a way that was .. . typical of the common law" (p. 44). 
Tracing the evolution of free speech law from its roots in post-World 
War I decisions beginning with Schenck v. United States,13 Strauss 
notes that modern free speech doctrine is a study of evolution, 
whereby the Court makes decisions based upon the particularized 
circumstances of a controversy, legal principles derived from past 
cases, and policy decisions appropriate for the time. As time passes, 
the Court, relying on previous decisions, modifies or abandons princi­
ples as it gains "a more thorough understanding of the kinds of issues 
involved in establishing constitutional protections for speech" (p. 47). 
Vincent Blasi's essay, Free Speech and Good Character, shifts from 
an examination of doctrinal evolution to a discussion of the ultimate 
theoretical question associated with the First Amendment: Why 
should we protect expression? Acknowledging that most proponents 
of free expression accord it high priority for one of three reasons -
promotion of human autonomy, promotion of the search for truth, and 
promotion of self-governance - Blasi proposes a fourth that he ar­
gues has greater explanatory power. Building upon the writings of 
John Milton, Blasi asserts that "a culture that prizes and protects 
expressive liberty nurtures in its members certain character traits such 
as inquisitiveness, distrust of authority, willingness to take initiative, 
and the courage to confront evil" that are valuable "for their instru­
mental contribution to collective well-being, social as well as political" 
12. Pp. 1-8; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 
U.S. 204 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
13. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
1570 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1566 
(p. 62). In contrast, a culture without free expression reinforces certain 
character flaws, including laziness, stubbornness, lack of trust and 
confidence, and overzealous rush to judgment (p. 68). Thus, Blasi 
notes that the character building of the First Amendment is "a coun­
terweight . .. to the natural tendency of all citizens . . .  to lose confi­
dence in reason and pursue their goals through force" (p. 78). 
Like Strauss's article, Kent Greenawalt's "Clear and Present 
Danger" and Criminal Speech examines the Court's foundational 
decisions and their evolution to modern doctrine, primarily focusing 
on the meaning of the clear-and-present-danger test established in 
Schenck. As Greenawalt notes, that test was hardly speech-protective 
in its original form, allowing punishment of speech in circumstances 
when there was little danger of harm (pp. 98-103). In later cases, how­
ever, the test came to have new meaning as the Court's views on 
speech protection and the requirements of "clear" and "present" 
changed (pp. 104-07). Ultimately, after a series of fits and starts, the 
Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio14 settled on the extremely speech­
protective version of the test still in use today. Greenawalt uses this 
evolution to discuss the difficult issues associated with the question of 
whether criminal speech - for example, solicitation or counseling -
should be protected, ultimately concluding that, because of the 
relationship to advocacy of political ideas, public forms of such speech 
should enjoy far greater protection than private forms (pp. 113-19). 
Richard Posner's piece, The Speech Market and the Legacy of 
Schenck, similarly focuses on Schenck's clear-and-present-danger 
test. His purpose, however, is to show that Schenck introduced an 
instrumentalist approach to the First Amendment, one that balances 
the costs and benefits of speech in a particular circumstance to 
determine whether that speech should be protected or subject to 
governmental regulation. Posner extends the clear-and-present-danger 
test's instrumentalist beginnings, formalizing it into an equation (B • 
pHl(l+d)" + 0-A) that allows us to identify concrete costs and benefits 
of speech versus governmental regulation (p. 125). Using variables 
such as the costs and benefits of speech along with the likelihood and 
imminence of their occurrence, the expression's offensiveness, and the 
costs of regulation, Posner analyzes a variety of speech issues, ranging 
from seditious advocacy and campaign finance to regulation of hate 
speech and the Internet (pp. 127-31, 144-51). 
In Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, Robert Post seeks to reconcile doctrine with popular 
theoretical accounts of free speech. As Post notes, two of the most 
powerful explanations for protecting free expression - the search for 
truth in the marketplace of ideas, and democratic self-governance -
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam ). 
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emerged from the Court's post-World War I decisions. There exist, 
however, significant doctrinal gaps and inconsistencies in the Court's 
decisions that these theories cannot explain (pp. 154-68). To fill these 
gaps, Post offers a different theoretical account - one he terms 
"participatory democracy" (p. 169). Post argues that American juris­
prudence shows "an overriding constitutional conviction to interpret 
the First Amendment 'to ensure that the individual citizen can effec­
tively participate in and contribute to our republican system of 
self-government.' "15 The commitment to participatory democracy 
explains the Court's willingness to protect some categories of speech, 
for example, offensive speech, when other theories cannot (pp. 168-
69). Post concludes that the Court chooses between theoretical 
accounts to justify its doctrinal approach to various categories of 
speech, thus "limit[ing] the kind of doctrinal simplicity and clarity that 
is constitutionally obtainable" (p. 173). 
Frederick Schauer's First Amendment Opportunism explores 
empirical bases of First Amendment doctrine. According to Schauer, 
the culture of First Amendment discourse ... exhibits many of the same 
features as being faced with driving a nail with a pipe wrench. With sur­
prising frequency, people and organizations with a wide array of political 
goals find that society has not given them the doctrinally or rhetorically 
effective argumentative tools they need to advance their goals. (p. 175) 
They thus turn to the First Amendment as a second-best tool to 
further their agendas. Schauer examines this phenomenon of First 
Amendment opportunism in various arenas, including the regulation 
of commercial speech, nude dancing, and campaign finance (pp. 177-
90), arguing that the existence and frequency of such opportunism 
"can tell us much about the power of the First Amendment today as a 
political force and rhetorical device" (p. 191). He concludes that, while 
First Amendment opportunism may be a problem for those who per­
ceive it as distorting free speech doctrine, it also may simply reflect the 
Constitution's role as a common-law document (pp. 196-97). 
Stanley Fish's The Dance of Theory seeks to debunk the notion 
that neutral, theoretical explanations of the First Amendment exist. 
Fish dismisses the notion that the First Amendment stands "for" any 
particular proposition, such as protecting the marketplace of ideas, 
and argues that proponents of such propositions move from the realm 
of ostensibly neutral abstraction to a "regime of censorship" that in­
fuses their own substantive notions of good (p. 199). Fish then decon­
structs the arguments of several commentators who have ostensibly 
proposed neutral, theoretical regimes in response to their own criti­
cisms of First Amendment doctrine (pp. 201-09) and argues that such 
regimes are "formal abstractions [which] have no content of their own, 
15. Pp. 169-70 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 
(1982)). 
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and to get content they must go to the very realm of messy partisan 
disputes about substantive goods of which they claim to be independ­
ent" (p. 224). He concludes that the continuing lure of theory reflects 
both an unwillingness to admit that a free speech principle is unavail­
able and a desire to give one's views on free speech a special pedigree. 
In the Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, Lillian Be Vier 
compares the current market for speech with other markets, noting 
that in recent years legal liability for harms resulting from political 
speech has decreased while legal liability for harms in other markets, 
such as products liability, has increased (pp. 233-41). She attributes 
this phenomenon to the Court's assumptions that "providers of politi­
cal information must be protected from liability because the market 
fails to permit them to internalize the full social benefits of their activ­
ity, whereas producers of other products must be subjected to liability 
because the market permits them to externalize some of their costs" 
(p. 239). Although she critiques these assumptions as empirically 
unproven and incomplete, Be Vier concludes that they reflect some 
"hitherto underappreciated features of the market for information," 
that allow the press to fulfill its constitutional function of informing 
the public (p. 242). 
Owen Fiss's The Censorship of Television also focuses on contem­
porary First Amendment issues, specifically the regulation of televi­
sion and its relationship to democracy. As one of the most important 
tools in the "informal educational system" essential to citizens partici­
pating in a democracy, Fiss argues, we must protect television from 
censorial threats to its educative role (pp. 257-60). Fiss identifies two 
kinds of censorship - traditional state censorship and managerial 
censorship involving a private actor within the television industry (pp. 
260-80). The Court, Fiss argues, has had little trouble protecting the 
educative function of television from state censorship but more 
difficulty in decisions involving managerial censorship. He contends, 
however, that attempts to rein in managerial censorship preserve tele­
vision's educative function although superficially appearing to be 
abridgments of speech. Despite the Supreme Court's past practices in 
the managerial-censorship area, Fiss notes with approval that recent 
free speech jurisprudence may increasingly protect against managerial 
censorship. 
Like Fiss, Cass Sunstein grapples with whether the First 
Amendment allows regulation of certain media to improve the opera­
tion of the speech market in The Future of Free Speech. According to 
Sunstein, the First Amendment should be understood as promoting 
"deliberative democracy," a system that contemplates "a large degree 
of reflection and debate, both within the citizenry and within govern­
ment itself" (p. 292). Emerging technologies pose a danger to delib­
erative democracy because they allow individuals increasingly to filter 
what they hear and thus withdraw from public debate (pp. 285-86). 
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Sunstein suggests that governmental regulation designed to enhance 
deliberative democracy may be appropriate, including such measures 
as disclosure requirements, must-carry rules, incentives for self­
regulation, and government subsidies of speech (pp. 304-09). 
II. DISCUSSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Truthfully, these essays break little new ground - previous publi­
cations present several of the authors' thoughts.16 Nevertheless, there 
is great value in bringing these ideas together in a single volume. 
Although the authors have very different perspectives regarding the 
First Amendment, all of the essays are simply excellent. Exposure to 
such concentrated thoughtfulness is both illuminating and pleasurable 
to read. 
More important, however, is that these different perspectives 
facilitate access to the First Amendment. Whether it is David Strauss's 
explanation of the evolving, piecemeal, and case-bound nature of free 
speech doctrine, Vincent Blasi's novel philosophical basis for 
protecting free expression, or Cass Sunstein's argument that free 
speech doctrine should move toward a concept respecting deliberative 
democracy, there is something for almost everyone in this book. 
Disagree with Blasi's theoretical precept regarding protection of 
speech? Then perhaps you will find what you want in Richard Posner's 
explicitly utilitarian accounting of costs and benefits of speech. For 
those trying to understand when and why to protect expression, this 
variety of perspectives brings the book to life in a concrete way and 
makes the First Amendment far more accessible than a single, static, 
or abstract approach to free expression. And the more accessible such 
ideas are, the easier they are to discuss. 
Moreover, the variety of perspectives in Eternally Vigilant illus­
trates that debate, discussion, and even criticism of the First 
Amendment are a positive thing. Certainly, the contributors to 
Eternally Vigilant disagree in ways that we cannot easily reconcile. 
Vincent Blasi's account of the First Amendment freedoms as 
grounded in human dignity and character, for example, is inconsistent 
with Richard Posner's amoral cost-benefit analysis of those same free­
doms. Similarly, Stanley Fish's mantra that no neutral theory of 
free expression exists is a direct attack on Robert Post's attempts to 
reconcile theory and doctrine. While some might view this disagree­
ment as cause for concern - evidence that First Amendment doctrine 
16. Professors Fish, Fish. and Sunstein, for example, openly acknowledge previous pub­
lication of pieces from which their essays are taken. Pp. 199 (Fish), 257 (Fiss), 185 (Sunstein). 
Professors Greenawalt and Strauss also have written extensively on closely related issues. 
See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME. AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989); 
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
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and scholarship are incoherent or that the Court's decisions result 
from politics rather than rational principles - they are mistaken. The 
varying viewpoints contained within Eternally Vigilant show that First 
Amendment freedoms are worth talking about. Their value comes less 
from the ultimate conclusions reached by courts and scholars than 
from the existence of an ongoing dialogue among courts, scholars, and 
the public regarding their meaning. As John Milton argued with 
respect to censorship: 
There be [those] who perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and 
make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. 'Tis 
their own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who neither 
will hear with meekness nor can convince, ·yet all must be suppressed 
which is not found in their [doctrines]. [They] are the troublers, ... the 
dividers of unity, who neglect and permit not others to unite those dis­
severed pieces which are yet wanting to the body of truth. [But] [t]o be 
still searching what we know not, by what we know ... this is the golden 
rule ... and makes up the best harmony ... not the forced and outward 
union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly divided minds.17 
Surely, we can extend this positive view of public disagreement to 
discussions of what the First Amendment does or should do. 
The editors of Eternally Vigilant clearly recognize the importance 
of "dialogue" as a primary good of both First Amendment doctrine 
and scholarship, most notably in their characterization of the history 
of free speech as an "experiment" that implies "a need for ongoing re­
view and adjustment" (p. ix). Their prefatory colloquy, structured as a 
dialogue between Stone and Bollinger, further emphasizes that fact. 
As that colloquy moves from topic to topic, it allows the editors to 
discuss the many facets of free speech history and scholarship, 
reflecting their complexity, richness, and varied nature. To be sure, the 
editors disagree on certain issues. But they do so in the context of a 
discussion, which allows give and take and aptly illustrates the value of 
dialogue. With this as the foundation for later essays, it should be 
obvious to the reader that the differing viewpoints are not an evil. 
Rather they are both a natural aspect of our daily lives and necessary 
to the evolution and understanding of free speech jurisprudence. 
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Eternally Vigilant, however, is 
that so many of the essays go beyond abstract theoretical and doctrinal 
discussions to explore influences on how First Amendment law is 
made and how those influences affect past and current decisions. 
David Strauss's essay describing the common-law overtones of free 
speech jurisprudence does this best, as he meticulously describes how 
the Court's doctrine evolved from early decisions to the current state 
of the law. Kent Greenawalt also focuses on the evolution of the clear­
and-present-danger test and its implications for criminal speech. 
17. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 42-43 (George H. Sabine ed., 1951 ) .  
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Frederick Schauer's demonstration that nonspeech issues are as 
responsible for free speech doctrine as free expression concerns also 
has an empirical focus, as do Cass Sunstein's and Owen Fiss's 
approaches, which view the law of free expression through the reality 
of modern broadcasting. Even Vincent Blasi's primarily philosophical 
essay reflects an understanding of actual human behavior often 
missing in theoretical scholarship. 
This differs somewhat from most scholarship associated with the 
First Amendment, which often involves an examination and critique 
of the appropriate theoretical underpinnings for the protection of 
expression, the current doctrinal rules, or the relationship between 
theory and doctrine. There are many advantages to this scholarship, 
primarily that it provides valuable new insights into protection of 
expression.18 But isolated discussions of theory and doctrine can take 
us only so far and rarely explain the entire picture. As Jerome Frank 
noted years ago, legal decisions are the result of many influences, of 
which the rule applied and its underlying theory are but two.19 The 
Court is a cultural institution where judges make decisions in often dif­
ficult social and political contexts that change over time. There are 
unspoken assumptions or events underlying these decisions that 
ultimately come to be expressed in different doctrinal rules. The 
collection of essays in Eternally Vigilant, by examining various 
potential influences on the development of free speech law, recognizes 
this fact and brings a greater maturity to our understanding of the 
First Amendment. 
To illustrate, one need look no further than the clear-and-present­
danger test that is the focus of so many of Eternally Vigilant's essays.20 
That test allowed courts to assess whether speech posed "a clear and 
present danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent."21 First announced in Schenck v. 
18. For example, philosophical accounts of.free expression often have broad rhetorical 
appeal for those looking for reasons to protect speech. See, for example, Justice Brandeis's 
eloquent appeal in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
They also often identify "broad patterns in constitutional law" that have great explanatory 
power regarding doctrinal issues. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 9, at 141. Finally, theo­
retical accounts, with their reliance on principle and consistency, "may help sustain a faith 
that constitutional practice involves a shared commitment to live by principle, and not by 
opportunism, sophistry, and manipulation." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a 
Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 566 (1999). Doctrinal scholarship can similarly 
find broad patterns in law, see, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983), as well as highlight significant flaws or 
advantages in the Court's approach. 
19. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 40 (1931). 
20. It is always difficult when reviewing a �olle.cted set of essays to focus on only one 
aspect of them as one risks missing other significant contributions. I focus on the clear-and­
present-danger test primarily because it has such significance to free-speech doctrine and 
because it provides a continuous example for discussion. 
21.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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United States, the Court used it for decades to assess whether seditious 
advocacy or other "dangerous" speech was subject to criminal 
punishment, or protected expression under the First Amendment. 
Conventional wisdom now holds that Schenck's clear-and-present­
danger test was a disaster, allowing punishment of speech that posed 
no harm to the government or public,22 and most people readily 
applaud the Court's apparent repudiation of it in favor of a much 
stricter standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio.23 But how do we reach this 
conclusion? Neither abstract theory nor doctrine helps much in this 
regard. 
Of course, judges and scholars have appealed to theory in criticiz­
ing the clear-and-present-danger test - most notably Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis in their influential opinions condemning several deci­
sions applying that test to uphold convictions of speakers who did little 
more than criticize the government. Holmes, for example, claimed 
that "the theory of our Constitution" is that "the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market."24 Brandeis argued that our Constitution protects "the 
power of reason as applied through public discussion."25 This is power­
ful rhetoric - so powerful that it still resonates with modern courts 
and individuals, who frequently cite it as a normative foundation for 
protecting speech. But it tells us little about the clear-and-present­
danger test. While the Holmes/Brandeis philosophies may support a 
more speech-protective version of the clear-and-present-danger test 
than applied in the Court's early cases, they do not compel that result. 
Nothing in Holmes's marketplace of ideas theory or Brandeis's auton­
omy theory tells us how "clear" or how "present" the danger must be, 
or what kinds of dangers justify suppression of speech. Theoretical 
accounts are simply too vague to have much normative value with 
respect to the clear-and-present-danger test. 
Furthermore, the Holmes/Brandeis philosophies do not provide a 
positive explanation of the Court's actions in moving away from the 
clear-and-present-danger test. There is no evidence that the Branden­
burg Court adopted these theoretical accounts as its driving force in 
seditious advocacy cases. In fact, the opinion is devoid of philosophical 
discussion, instead focusing on the concrete problem of where to draw 
22. See, e.g., David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present Dan­
ger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217 ( 1998); Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: 
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970). 
23. 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that state can punish speech only 
if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action"). 
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
25. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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the line between punishable incitement of illegal activity and 
protected speech. 
Abstract, doctrinal discussions also have only weak explanatory 
power regarding our dislike of, and the Court's movement away from, 
the clear-and-present-danger test. There is nothing inherently wrong 
with that test as a doctrinal tool. True, it is fundamentally a balancing 
test susceptible to subjective judgments of harm, but that alone does 
not condemn it. The world of constitutional adjudication is full of 
balancing tests that seem to work reasonably well. In fact, outside of 
the context of seditious advocacy, the clear-and-present-danger test 
was often applied in a manner quite protective of speech,26 suggesting 
that balancing as a concept was not so much the. problem as was the 
application of that balancing in a particular context. 
In order to understand truly our dislike of the clear-and-present­
danger test, we must look beyond this abstract balancing test to the 
influences on its application. As David Strauss's and Kent 
Greenawalt's essays aptly demonstrate, our condemnation of the 
clear-and-present-danger test, and the Court's ultimate repudiation of 
it, are both largely the result of evolutionary processes. As the Court 
repeatedly upheld convictions of seemingly innocuous speech, judges 
and scholars began to question the wisdom of the clear-and-present­
danger approach in the seditious advocacy context. Thus, the Court's 
evolution to the rule in Brandenburg was not simply repudiation of 
one abstract test in favor of another. It was a response to the decisions 
upholding convictions that came before, which the Court began to 
view as mistaken applications of a test that proved far too malleable 
and subject to political pressure, especially during certain crisis 
periods. In essence, our view of the clear-and-present-danger test, and 
the Court's retreat from it, reflect the accumulated wisdom of fifty 
years of history, which revealed the kind of abuse that such a test 
might engender. By going beyond isolated theoretical or doctrinal 
accounts and examining the impact that this evolution had on the law, 
Strauss and Greenawalt flesh out our understanding of how First 
Amendment doctrine came to be what it is and what the implications 
of that evolution are for current doctrine. Whether one does this in the 
context of the clear-and-present-danger test or in the many other con­
texts contained in the other essays, the desire to explore outside influ­
ences on the law can only enrich the already rich First Amendment 
literature. 
26. See, e.g. , Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
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III. FURTHER FACILITATING FIRST AMENDMENT DISCUSSIONS 
For all that Eternally Vigilant contributes to a better understanding 
of First Amendment doctrine, it could have done more. Although the 
contributors' explanations of legal doctrine and its real-world context 
are valuable, the essays still focus mainly on the evolution of legal doc­
trine alone, with little discussion of the social, political, psychological, 
or other influences that inform many of the decisions they discuss. To 
be fair, many of the contributors explicitly acknowledge these influ­
ences. David Strauss and Kent Greenawalt, for example, refer to 
certain historical accounts of social and political conditions during 
World War I, the Red Scare, and the Cold War periods, in which the 
most significant clear-and-present-danger cases were decided. But 
their references are limited with no detailed discussion of those condi­
tions' impact on the Court's decisions. As such, they tend to reinforce 
the notion that law can be studied in isolation, although I do not think 
that the authors or the editors intend this. A greater examination of 
these types of influences on the Court's decisions would complement 
the evolutionary approach discussed above and advance our under­
standing of the Court's doctrine even further.27 By providing a con­
crete context in which to place the Court's doctrine, this examination 
would give greater access to it and further facilitate discussion. 
Continuing with the clear-and-present-danger test discussed above, 
this Section will first examine Schenck and the social, historical, and 
political forces surrounding it. It will then discuss how examination 
can facilitate better understanding of and dialogue regarding the 
Court's jurisprudence. 
A. Schenck and Its Historical, Social, and Political Context 
Schenck, the decision in which the clear-and-present-danger test 
originated, arose out of government prosecutions of members of the 
Socialist Party for conspiring to obstruct the draft in violation of the 
Espionage Act of 1917. During World War I, Charles Schenck and 
other party members mailed pamphlets attacking the draft to potential 
draftees.28 One side of the pamphlet urged that the draft was unconsti­
tutional and that people join the Socialist Party in its attempt to repeal 
27. There are many scholars who have done admirable historical work on free expres­
sion issues. See, e.g. , MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE" (2000); MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS 
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); RABBAN, supra note l; Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 335 (2003); William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic AntiCommunism: 
The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 Sur. CT. REV. 375. Unfortunately, such 
studies are usually free-standing, and other scholars rarely incorporate these or other 
historical studies in an in-depth manner. 
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919). 
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the Conscription Act.29 The other side contained somewhat stronger 
language, urging people to "assert [their] rights" and arguing that "[i]n 
lending tacit or silent consent to the conscription law, in neglecting to 
assert your rights, you are (whether unknowingly or not) helping to 
condone and support a most infamous and insidious conspiracy to 
abridge and destroy the sacred and cherished rights of a free people. "30 
Finding that such statements tended to interfere with the war effort, a 
jury easily convicted Schenck. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Schenck's argument that 
the First Amendment protected the pamphlets' Statements. Justice 
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, acknowledged that in 
peacetime, defendant's speech might have been protected by the First 
Amendment.31 Noting, however, the wartime context and that the 
"character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
done," Holmes framed the First Amendment test as "whether the 
words used [were] in such circumstances and [were] of such a nature 
as to create a clear and ·present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. "32 Although 
Holmes acknowledged that many of the statements urged lawful resis­
tance, he nevertheless found that they presented a clear and present 
danger of draft obstruction. According to Holmes, the defendant's 
intent to obstruct the draft could be presumed (despite the lack of evi­
dence) because the pamphlet "would not have been sent unless it had 
been intended to have some effect. "33 This presumed intent -
combined with wartime circumstances - justified extreme caution 
and the rejection of Schenck's free speech claim. 
Holmes's opinion is notable for its recognition that the clear-and­
present-danger test depends largely upon the concrete circumstances 
in which it is applied, although, ironically, he ignored such circum­
stances, other than the general wartime reference, in reaching his deci­
sion. To the extent Holmes found the wartime circumstances impor­
tant, it is useful to examine them. How did the Espionage Act and 
related legislation come about? How was it used? What was the public 
sentiment regarding World War I and those who protested it? What 
were the government's actions with respect to the war and those who 
spoke out against it? All of these questions are part of the Schenck 
equation and the answers to them shed considerable light on our 
response to the clear-and-present-danger test and related issues. 
29. RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS 213-14 (1987). 
30. Id. at 214. 
31. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 51. 
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From its inception, World War I was largely unpopular among 
influential groups who were " 'apathetic if not actually hostile to 
fighting.' "34 Like Charles Schenck, many of those opposing the war 
were foreign-born Americans or immigrants (especially Irish and 
German), socialists, pacifists, and progressives who belonged to radi­
cal groups, such as the Industrial Workers of the World ("IWW"), 
Non-Partisan League ("NPL"), and the Socialist Party of America 
("SPA").35 Such groups were especially vocal, calling for 
"[c]ontinuous, active, and public opposition to the war, through dem­
onstrations, mass petitions, and all other means within [their] 
power."36 Although radical groups were not popular with Americans 
generally, during this early period there were substantial increases in 
IWW, NPL, and SPA membership, giving them an even more power­
ful voice against the war.37 
Concerned about vocal antipathy toward the war and convinced of 
the need to present a united patriotic front, the Wilson administration 
found ways to repress antiwar sentiment. President Wilson himself 
tried to whip up national hysteria regarding opponents to the war, 
relying heavily on negative portrayals of immigrants and other foreign 
influences. As early as his 1915 State of the Union address to 
Congress, Wilson claimed that 
the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been ut­
tered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States . . 
born under other flags but welcomed by our generous naturalization 
laws ... who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries 
of our national life . . .  38 
In his 1917 address asking Congress to recognize a state of war, Wilson 
claimed that German spies hidden within the United States 
government and its communities threatened security.39 A few months 
later, in an address that was widely distributed throughout the 
country, Wilson accused "the military masters of Germany" of filling 
34. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 105 
(1978) (quoting THOMAS A. BAILEY, WOODROW WILSON AND THE LOST PEACE 15 
(1944)). 
35. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 7 
(1960). 
36. NATHAN FINE, LABOR AND FARMER PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1828-1928, 
at 13-14 (1928) (reprinting Majority Report of the SPA as adopted at its April 1917 national 
convention); see also JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA, 1912-
1925, al 125-27 (1967). 
37. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 105-06; ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY 
IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA 28-29 (1955). 
38. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Dec. 7, 1915), in 53 CONG. REC. 
99 (1915). 
39. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Apr. 2, 1917), in 55 CONG. REC. 
104 (1917). 
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"our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators 
and [seeking] to corrupt the opinion of our people."40 Wilson further 
explicitly linked foreign enemies to radical groups, noting that 
German officials employed "liberals in their enterprise. They are using 
men . . . socialists, the leaders of labor" to sow disloyalty.41 Thus, 
people like Schenck, who were little more than social activists, came to 
be equated with spies and other traitors. 
Wilson's efforts, aided by a mainstream press generally willing to 
engage in propaganda and groups of private vigilantes willing to spy 
upon their neighbors, sowed the seeds of intolerance and suspicion of 
radical or heavily immigrant groups.42 In the years leading up to and 
during the war, there were numerous acts of violence expressing 
"nativist loathing of the foreign-born and irrational fear of radical 
groups."43 Despite these actions, antiwar groups remained vocal. As 
the Wilson administration became concerned that existing laws and 
actions were insufficient to handle antiwar sentiment,44 it looked to 
more formal means to repress dissent. 
The Wilson administration used a variety of legal tools to deal with 
the "problem" of disloyalty. In 1917 the President issued a series of 
proclamations that allowed the government to register, arrest, and 
intern "enemy aliens," and that established, among other things, a 
loyalty program for federal employees, a "Committee on Public 
Information" (a propaganda committee designed to corral the press 
into voluntary self-censorship), a "Board of Censorship" responsible 
for scrutinizing communications leaving the country, and a program 
expanding the censorship power of the Navy over cable lines.45 In 
addition, arguing that censorship was "absolutely necessary to the 
public safety,"46Wilson also proposed legislation designed to "repress 
'political agitation,' particularly 'disloyal propaganda' threatening the 
formation and maintenance of the armed forces."47 
40. President Woodrow Wilson, Flag Day Address (June 14, 1917), in 55 CONG. REC. 
app. at 332 (1917). 
41. Id. at 334; see a/so JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM 135 (1999) (dis­
cussing distribution of flag day address). 
42. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 20; SMITH, supra note 41, at 135-37. 
43. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 32; SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 50-51; SMITH, supra 
note 41, at 135. 
44. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 249-50; SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 23. 
45. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 108-09; SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 14-17, 21. 
46. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 18 (quoting Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to 
Rep. Webb (May 22, 1917), reprinted in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 46 
(1927)). 
47. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 249 (quoting John Lord O'Brian, Special Asst. Atty 
Gen.). 
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In proposing the original version of the Espionage Act, Wilson 
sought substantial authority to forbid the publication of hostile utter­
ances that might interfere with the war effort.48 Congressional and 
public response to such censorship power was ambivalent at best and 
eventually that aspect of the legislation died.49 As adopted, the 
Espionage Act instead provided criminal penalties for intentionally 
making false reports that interfere with the war effort, causing insub­
ordination or disloyalty in the military forces, or obstructing the draft. 
It further authorized the Postmaster to refuse to mail materials 
violating the Act.so Although these provisions did not amount to the 
prior restraint Wilson sought, there is evidence that much of Congress 
desired the Act to be used to restrict speech.s1 
In 1918 Congress took yet another step toward repression. Despite 
the fact that over 250 people had been convicted under the Espionage 
Act in less than a year, members of Congress and the Wilson admini­
stration were unhappy with the Act's inability to reach some disloyal 
utterances.s2 Claiming that "some of the most dangerous types of 
propaganda were either made from good motives or else that the trai­
torous motive was not provable,'' the Attorney General argued that 
the intent requirement of the Espionage Act posed too high a barrier 
for conviction and urged Congress to adopt a law specifically aimed at 
disloyal utterances.s3 The Sedition Act,s4 adopted in May of 1918, 
solved this problem by punishing publication of information intended 
to cause contempt for the United States government, the Constitution, 
or the flag of the United States, or to support a country at war with the 
United States. 
The Wilson administration viewed the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts as its "most effective method of suppressing unwanted 'propa­
ganda' and of dealing with 'disturbing malcontents.' "ss During the 
war, federal attorneys brought over 2,100 indictments under the 
48. SMITH, supra note 41, at 131. 
49. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 250-55; SMITH, supra note 41, at 131; Stone, supra note 27, 
at 346-49. 
50. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I,§ 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219. 
51. The extent of congressional desire to suppress speech is open to debate. David Rab­
ban argues that contemporaneous legislative debates "reveal that the majority of 
Congress intended the Espionage Act to encourage the restrictive uudicial) decisions that 
resulted." RABBAN, supra note 1, at 250. On the other hand, Geoffrey Stone argues that 
"[a)lthough Congress' stance in enacting the Espionage Act could hardly be characterized as 
civil libertarian; [most congressmen had) a genuine concern for the potential impact of the 
legislation on the freedom of speech and of the press." Stone, supra note 27, at 352. 
52. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 23. 
53. Id. at 23-24. For a more in-depth account of the causes leading up to the Sedition 
Act, see POLENBERG, supra note 29, at 30-34. 
54. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, §§ 1, 3, 40 Stat. 553, 553 (repealed 1921). 
55. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 256. 
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Acts.56 Most of these indictments involved speech critical of the war or 
the government rather than overt acts of disloyalty.57 Thus, individuals 
were indicted for such things as 
• advising conscripted men · that they should have "a pick and 
shovel laboring for the working men instead of carrying a gun 
for the capitalists"; 
• distributing a pamphlet preaching that "Christians should not 
kill in wars"; 
• petitioning the governor of South Dakota to change a political 
decision exempting certain counties from the draft; 
• stating that the capitalists' war would make liberty bonds 
worthless;58 
• stating that "[w]e must make the world safe for democracy, 
even if we have to bean the goddess ofliberty to do it"; 
• stating that "[m)en conscripted· to Europe are virtually con­
demned to death and everyone knows it"; 
• stating that "I am for the people and· the government is for the 
profiteers';; 
· · 
• "circulating a pamphlet urging the re-election of a 
Congressman who had voted against conscription";59 
• claiming "to hell with Wilson; I am a Republican"; 
• writing a letter denouncing Liberty Loans; and 
• giving a speech denouncing the conscription of Puerto Rican 
citizens who refused to accept American citizenship.60 
Such indictments reached far into the realm of seemingly innocent 
speech, especially given that many .statements were made in private 
conversations rather than public addresses.61 Many prosecutions, 
however, went beyond overly zealous and were specifically designed 
to destroy the radical, socialist groups ·feared by the Wilson admini­
stration, such as the IWW and SP A of which Charles Schenck was a 
member. Thus, as one scholar notes, 
56. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 113. 
57. ZECHARIAH CHAFFE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 60-69 (1941); 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 113. As one Wilson . administration official later acknowl­
edged, no person was convicted of actual espionage activity under the 1917 Act. JOHN LORD 
O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 49-50 (1955). 
58. These examples come from RABBAN, supra note 1, at 259-60. 
59. These examples are found in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 113-14. 
60. These last three examples are from SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 23 nn.47, 53. For 
further examples, see CHAFFE, supra note 57, at 51-57; Stone, supra note 27, at 338-41. 
61. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 115. 
1584 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1566 
seemingly random prosecutions had a pattern behind them; persons or 
publications "who had assured economic and social status, did not ques­
tion the basis of our economic system, accepted the war as a holy crusade 
and expressed their views in somewhat temperate language" were al­
lowed to criticize the government; those who suffered were "those whose 
views on the war were derived from some objectionable economic or 
social doctrines ... regardless of their attitude towards Germany" along 
with obscure individuals who used "indiscreet or impolite, sometimes 
vulgar language to express their views."62 
In this way, such prosecutions were used less to punish disloyalty than 
to enforce national conformity - either by frightening into silence 
those without sufficient social position to fight back or by systemati­
cally harassing disfavored groups. 
The courtroom provided protestors little protection from such 
harassment. Given the nativist sentiment and hysteria stirred up by the 
Wilson administration, most judges and juries easily convicted those 
accused under the Acts, apparently with the attitude that "an oppo­
nent of war was guilty unless proved innocent."63 At least 1,055 of the 
2,100 defendants indicted were convicted, including over 150 IWW 
leaders.64 Courts reached these conclusions by construing the require­
ments of the Espionage and Sedition Acts loosely. One judge, for 
example, instructed a jury that the defendant's attempts to obstruct 
Red Cross fundraising efforts violated the Espionage Act because it 
interfered with the "military and naval forces of the United States."65 
To the extent that defendants raised First Amendment defenses to 
their prosecutions, courts either ignored them or resolved them under 
the prevailing "bad tendency" test, an extremely deferential test 
allowing punishment of speech if it might tend to cause harm.66 In 
many courtrooms, judges and jurors viewed their verdicts as patriotic 
statements and imposed severe sentences "as a means of fostering 
unity and bolstering morale. "67 Thus, federal courtrooms, the last 
bastion of defense against unfair convictions for simple criticism of the 
government or war effort, were dominated by actors whose response 
to the war was so extreme that even Justice Holmes, the author of 
Schenck, later described it as "hysterical."68 
62. Id. (quoting SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 32). 
63. H.C. PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR 1917-1918, at 153 (1957); 
see also RABBAN, .mpra note 1, at 256-61. 
64. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 19. 
65. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 260. 
66. Id. at 256. 
67. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 43 n.7. 
68. Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 16, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS 189, 190 (Mark De Wolf Howe ed., 1953). 
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B. Some Lessons from History 
This is the context in which Schenck arose; it is not pretty. It 
certainly was not conducive to free expression given a president who, 
determined to suppress any possible barriers to his goals, enlisted 
Congress and the public to create an atmosphere of national hysteria 
and nativist sentiment that silenced critics. The hysteria engendered 
by the administration permeated the courtroom as well, with zealous 
prosecutions and jurors imbued with patriotic fervor making it nearly 
impossible for accused protestors to avoid convictions. Awareness of 
these circumstances gives context to our discussion of Schenck's clear­
and-present-danger test in a way that even Strauss's and Greenawalt's 
evolutionary accounts cannot. 
This history reveals, for example, that Justice Holmes's characteri­
zation of the clear-and-present-danger test was merely an extension of 
lower courts' use of the bad-tendency test to silence dissent in war­
time.69 Holmes never meant for the clear-and-present-danger test to 
be applied in a protective manner - at least not in Schenck. True, one 
can probably glean this from reading the case, but the historical 
discussion gives an added flavor emphasizing the strength and depth 
of judicial hostility toward war protestors that informs our assessment 
of the clear-and-present-danger test's application and our desire to 
move away from such a test over time. 
This study also reveals much about the nature of human actors, 
which may facilitate further understanding of our dislike of the clear­
and-present-danger test. When one is aware of intense public hysteria 
surrounding radical groups and protestors, it is relatively easy to pre­
dict that the clear-and-present-danger test will be an ineffective tool 
for protecting speech. As cognitive psychologists have tested empiri­
cally, in times of great fear, people tend to overestimate greatly the 
likelihood that certain particularly dreaded or catastrophic events will 
occur.70 As a result, they favor regulation of such risks, even if the 
actual likelihood of occurrence is minute.71 There is little reason to 
think that judges are immune to such cognitive biases.72 Thus, the 
clear-and-present-danger test, when used by judges in times of crisis, 
may provide little if any protection for speech.73 Schenck is arguably 
69. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 279-98. 
70. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEfYfION OF RISK 220-31 (2000). 
71. HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 1 71, 174-75 (1996); SLOVIC, supra note 
70, at 152. 
72. Chris Guthrie & Jeff Rachlinksi et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
777, 816-18 (2001) (noting that judges are often subject to the same cognitive biases as aver­
age individuals). 
73. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-making: 
A Case Study of Dennis v. United States (June 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
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an example of that fact, as are many other cases decided in crisis 
times.74 It is only by examining the history surrounding these cases, 
however, that we truly come to understand the clear-and-present­
danger test as grounded in human nature and not simply as an 
abstract, but flawed, doctrinal tool. 
The Wilson administration's apparent dual motives in suppressing 
speech further inform our response to the clear-and-present-danger 
test. The Wilson administration used the Espionage and Sedition Act 
prosecutions not just to silence dissent but also to destroy certain 
disfavored groups. These mixed motives suggest a willingness on the 
executive's part to use crises as excuses to further other agendas. The 
lenient application of the clear-and-present-danger test in Schenck and 
other crisis-period cases facilitated the administration's pretextual use 
of such crises. This government opportunism, while perhaps inevita­
ble,75 is hardly desirable, as the Court has come to acknowledge that 
certain governmental motives for regulating speech are illegitimate.76 
Thus, our distaste for the clear-and-present-danger test may stem in 
part from its inability in times of crisis to protect against illegitimate 
government actions. 
This historical account complements Strauss's and Greenawalt's 
evolutionary accounts of the test. As Strauss noted, judges deciding 
constitutional cases respond to previous decisions and determine 
whether adjustments or retrenchments are needed when ruling on the 
case before them. They do not, however, view law in a vacuum, 
determining simply that X application of Y rule was bad. Rather, they 
examine the broader context in which rules are constituted and 
applied and their consequences. Thus, the Brandenburg Court 
eschewed the clear-and-present-danger test not simply because the 
defendant Ku Klux Klansman involved in that case was harmless but 
because, with fifty years of hindsight, most of the defendants involved 
in clear-and-present-danger cases were harmless. That political 
machinations and hysteria were often the primary motivators for 
74. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1945). For a discussion of judicial capitulation to hysteria in Korematsu and related cases, 
see Christina E. Wells & Joseph Kuhl, The Japanese-American Detention Cases and Their 
Relationship to Events in the United States After September 11th, 5 INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
91, 94-101 (2002). 
75. See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948). 
76. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) ("The First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in 
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.") (opinion of Stevens, J., 
writing for plurality); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock prin­
ciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the ex­
pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."). 
For a discussion of illegitimate government motives, see Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating 
Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurispru­
dence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 174-75 (1997). 
May 2003) Discussing the First Amendment 1587 
earlier decisions was a fact of which the Supreme Court was aware and 
against which it was trying to guard in Brandenburg. 
Finally, this study of history can inform modern debate regarding 
First Amendment freedoms both for scholars and for the public. For 
example, the modern Court's doctrine treats laws regulating speech 
based upon content with far greater antipathy than those laws that do 
not. The Court's hostility toward content-based regulations is closely 
associated with the clear-and-present-danger cases, although the 
Court rarely links the two explicitly.77 Knowledge and understanding 
of this history may inform scholarly debates sparked by commentators 
who increasingly criticize the Court's hostility toward content-based 
regulations.78 
The importance of Schenck's history with respect to the public may 
be more straightforward. In the current climate of heightened fear that 
exists post-September 11th, citizens have expressed the notion that 
civil rights may need to be sacrificed in the name of security. In fact, 
the phrase "clear and present danger" has reared its ugly head again 
as a justification for limiting civil liberties.79 In such times, it is useful 
to be reminded of the depth and magnitude of past mistakes made 
with that same sentiment in mind. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
None of this is to say that the editors of Eternally Vigilant should 
have put together a different book. As it currently stands, the editors' 
and authors' contributions to the discussion regarding the First 
Amendment are substantial and thoughtful. Eternally Vigilant is, how­
ever, representative of much First Amendment scholarship, which 
focuses too often on theory and doctrine without also discussing the 
variety of real-world influences on constitutional decisions. In a book 
that celebrates the "experimental" nature of free speech law, recogni-
77. Many of the cases involving the clear-and-present-danger test reflect the presence 
of an illegitimate government motive that is at the heart of the Court's antipathy to 
content-based regulations. For example, many of the seditious advocacy cases involved gov­
ernment fear that antiwar speech would persuade citizens to oppose the war. See, e.g. , 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 
(1919). Concern with attempts to regulate persuasive effect clearly underlies the Court's ap­
proach to content-based regulations. See Wells, supra note 76, at 173-75 (and cases cited 
therein); cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending 
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2447 (1996) (noting the relationship between the 
Court's use of strict scrutiny and earlier clear-and-present-danger precedents). 
78. David Rabban, for example, uses much of the history surrounding Schenck to re­
spond to Professors Sunstein and Fiss, who argue that we should welcome governmental 
regulation of content in some instances. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 381 -93. 
79. Testifying before Congress in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed that "terrorism is a clear and present danger to 
Americans today." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Outlines 
Mobilization Against Terrorism Act (Sept. 24, 2001). 
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tion of the importance of the circumstances under which that experi­
ment takes place would be welcome - a fact made even more true 
given the authors' expressed desire to reach "non-experts." The belief 
in free expression is a widely held ideal. It is, however, an abstract one 
that the public and, occasionally, legal scholars are willing to sacrifice 
in certain concrete circumstances. The more one is educated regarding 
the concrete influences on the development of First Amendment law, 
the better our discussion of the merits of those sacrifices can be. 
